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Abstract
The present research examines the effect of power in impression formation. In line with prior research on persuasion, we
hypothesized that having power increases reliance on thoughts relative to being powerless. Participants in this experiment
were first led to generate either positive or negative thoughts about a job candidate by providing them with a strong or weak
vita. Following this manipulation, participants were instructed to remember episodes of their lives in which they either had
power over others or others had power over them. Relative to powerless participants, those induced to feel powerful showed
more reliance on the thoughts listed. As a consequence, the effect of the direction of the thoughts on subsequent judgments of
the job candidate (including judgments of competence and warmth) was greater for participants with high, as opposed to
low power. These results reveal for the first time that power can validate what people think about other people.
Keywords: Attitudes, first impressions, persuasion, power, self-validation.
El poder aumenta el uso de las primeras
impresiones
Resumen
La presente investigación examina el efecto del poder sobre la formación de impresiones. En línea con la investigación pre-
via en el contexto de la persuasión, se esperaba que las personas con alto poder utilizaran sus pensamientos en mayor medida
que las personas con bajo poder. Para poner a prueba esta hipótesis, se llevó a cabo un experimento en el que los participantes
primero generaron pensamientos favorables o desfavorables hacia un candidato a un puesto de trabajo en función de los méri-
tos de su curriculum vitae. A continuación, se pidió a los participantes que pensaran en episodios previos en los que tuvieron
poder sobre otra persona o en episodios en los que tuvieron poder sobre ellos. Los participantes asignados a la condición de alto
poder utilizaron más sus pensamientos iniciales al juzgar al candidato (tanto en términos de competencia como de atractivo)
que aquellos en la condición de bajo poder. Estos resultados sugieren por primera vez que el poder puede validar lo que pien-
san las personas sobre los demás.
Palabras clave: Actitudes, primeras impresiones, persuasión, poder, auto-validación.
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Imagine the following scenario. Two individuals have just completed examination of
the resume of a potential job candidate. One individual feels powerful and in control of
his environment, whereas the second person feels powerless and not in control of his
environment. How would these distinct psychological states, feeling powerful versus
powerless, influence each individual’s response to the resume they have examine? Would
feeling powerful lead one to a more positive or a more negative evaluation of the
candidate than feeling powerless? Would it matter whether the candidate had a strong or
a weak vita? The present research addresses these questions by examining experimentally
how power influences perceptions of other people based on their credentials. Specifically,
we investigate how power affects use of one’s own thoughts in response to strong and
weak vitas of potential job candidates.
Power has been recognized as a central motivating force in human relationships and
action (Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 1993; Parker & Rubenstain, 1981; Thibaut & Kelley,
1959). For example, Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003) stated that power is a basic
force in social relationships, and Turner (2005) argued that every group, organization, and
society must solve the problem of power to achieve its goals or risk failure, dysfunction,
or even extinction. Not only has power been recognized as a central force in human
relationships and social behavior, but it has been also extensively studied in regard to its
impact on cognitive processes (e.g., Guinote & Vescio, 2010).
Power Effects in Persuasion as a Function of Cognitive Processes
In agreement with the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion (ELM, Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & Briñol, 2012), we suggest that the psychological processes
mediating the effect of power on attitude change can be organized into a finite set that
operate at different points along an elaboration continuum. Specifically, the ELM
describes several processes of primary cognition through which variables like power can
affect persuasion: by serving as a simple cue, by affecting either the amount or direction
of thinking, and by functioning as an argument. The specific role of power depends on
when it is induced and on the level of elaboration. 
First, when thinking is likely to be low (e.g., an environment with many distractions),
power should act as a simple cue to persuasion by serving as a positive cue or invoking a
simple heuristic. Under low ability and motivation to think, power can influence
attitudes by operating as a cue implying that the power-holder (e.g., whether oneself or
another person) is right or his/her opinion has more weight. Indeed, feelings of high
power can lead a person to heuristically conclude that his or her own position is valid and
should be adopted, whereas feelings of low power would imply that one’s position is
invalid and should be rejected. Just as people naturally infer happiness from observations
of smiling, whether the smiling occurs in others or themselves, people can infer validity
of views from power positions, whether power occurs in others or themselves (e.g.,
Festinger & Thibaut, 1951; Kelman, 1958; Kipnis, 1972). 
Second, if thinking is not already set to be high or low by other variables and feelings
of power are high prior to message exposure, its role in the persuasion process is likely to
be a reduction of thinking. This is consistent with previous research (Fiske, 1993)
showing that power can reduce the extent of processing of incoming information, and
with research showing that people in powerful positions rely more on stereotypes than
the powerless (i.e., rely on simple cues; see Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000;
Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002; Fiske, 1993; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Keltner & Robinson,
1996; Ng, 1980; Rodríguez-Bailón, Moya, & Yzerbyt, 2000). In a relevant study
conducted in the domain of attitude change (Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra,
2007, Experiment 2), power was found to influence attitude change by reducing the
extent to which participants thought about a message. This effect took place when power
was induced before receiving the message, and elaboration was not constrained to be very
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high or very low by other variables. Subsequent research has conceptually replicated these
findings by showing that power increases confidence in self-views leading power-holders
to ignore the information (Johnson & Lammers, 2012) and advice provided by others
thereby reducing accuracy in their subsequent judgments (See, Morrison, Rothman, &
Soll, 2011). 
Third, when the likelihood of thinking is relatively high (e.g., few distractions,
important topic), the same experience of power prior to a message can impact persuasion
by other processes. For example, power might bias people’s thoughts in a manner
consistent with their initial attitude making them less susceptible to change. This idea
is consistent with the finding that people in powerful (vs. powerless) roles are more likely
to attend to information that confirms rather than disconfirms their expectations,
showing more confirmatory bias (Copeland, 1994; Fischer, Fischer, Englich, Aydin, &
Frey, 2011; see also Lammers & Yang, 2012, in this volumen). Power can also bias the
content of the thoughts that come to mind in other ways that are less relevant for
persuasion. For example, work by Guinote and colleagues has shown that high (vs. low)
power leads people to focus more on their personally relevant goals, increasing the
accessibility and attention paid to what they consider more important at the moment
(Guinote, 2007; Slabu & Guinote, 2010)1. 
Furthermore, when thinking is high, power could be evaluated as evidence if it
provides diagnostic information about the merits of an object. For example, power could
spark the perception that a person posses some particular abilities or personality (e.g.,
ambition, social skills) in an impression formation task. For example, a person who feels
powerful can view this as a compelling argument for entering jobs related to politics. Of
course, if people believe that their judgments are somehow being biased or influenced by
their power, and they do not want this to occur, they can adjust their judgments in a
direction opposite to the expected bias (i.e., a correction effect; Wegener & Petty, 1997). 
Power Effects as a Function of Meta-Cognitive Processes
In addition to these possibilities relevant to primary cognition, we have more recently
proposed that power, like other variables, can also impact whether or not people use their
thoughts by influencing what people think about their thoughts. This general idea is
referred to as the self-validation hypothesis (Petty, Briñol & Tormala, 2002). The key tenet
is that generating or having thoughts is not sufficient for these thoughts to impact
judgment. Rather, people must also have confidence in the thoughts. When people
perceive their thoughts to be valid, they have confidence in them and rely on them in
forming their judgments. When people have doubts about their thoughts or perceive
them to be invalid, they are less likely to use them as a basis for judgment. Thus, self-
validation provides an additional mechanism by which variables such as power can
influence attitudes – by affecting thought confidence. Unlike previous mechanisms of
attitude change that focus on primary or first-order cognition, this new process
emphasizes secondary or meta-cognition (Briñol & DeMarree, 2012; Petty, Briñol,
Tormala, & Wegener, 2007, see also, Briñol, Gandarillas, Horcajo, & Becerra, 2010). 
In the present research, we test the idea that power can influence reliance on thoughts.
Relevant to this possibility, previous research has established a link between power and
confidence, and between power and action. For example, past research suggests that high-
power individuals often act as if they are confident (e.g., expressing their opinions in
public: Gonzaga, Keltner, Londalh, & Smith, 2001; Guinote et al., 2002), and that
people who lack power act as if they lack confidence (e.g., speaking out more passively,
and showing more hesitations in their public behaviors, Holtgraves & Lasky, 1999;
Hosman, 1989). Experimental studies have also revealed that high-power individuals are
more likely to act on their desires (e.g., Galinsky, Gruenfeld & Magee, 2003; Keltner, et
al., 2003). Consistent with this view, correlational evidence has also revealed that high-
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power individuals show more personality-behavior correspondence (e.g., they are more
likely to approach, touch, and flirt than those with low-power; Anderson, John, Keltner,
& Kring, 2001; Guinote, et al., 2002). Similarly, low-power individuals seem to hesitate
and behave more passively, and to display more inhibited expressions than high-power
individuals (e.g., Ellyson & Dovidio, 1985; Moreland & Levine, 1989). 
We postulate that powerful individuals are simply more likely to act on whatever they
might have in mind at a given moment than low-power individuals because of the greater
confidence with which they hold their thoughts. Our previous research on persuasion is
consistent with this view showing that high-power individuals trusted their thoughts in
response to a persuasive message when evaluating different topics and proposals (Briñol,
et al., 2007)2. As in prior self-validation studies, these effects were only present under
high elaboration conditions and when power followed thought generation. For a variable
such as power to affect thought-confidence (instead of the number or direction of the
thoughts), it is best to induce it after information processing when people are most likely
to reflect on the thoughts they have already generated. 
Predictions: The Relationship between Power and Impression Formation 
The first studies on the effects of power through self-validation processes were
conducted in a traditional persuasion setting in which attitudes changed with respect to
a particular proposal. Having demonstrated that power can determine the extent of
influence by affecting reliance on thoughts in response to persuasive proposals, the
present research examines for the first time whether power can validate other kinds of
thoughts, and thus whether other social judgment phenomena can similarly benefit from
a consideration of self-validation processes. We propose that power can not only validate
thoughts in response to a persuasive proposal, but also can validate thoughts about other
people. That is, the confidence that power makes people feel applies to whatever the
salient or available mental contents are at the time. Thus, the self-validation framework
can be applied to domains other than traditional persuasive messages about issues, such
as interpersonal impression formation. 
Our argument is that what it is important is who generates the thoughts in the first
place (the self) rather that what the thoughts are about (self, proposals, issues, or other
people). Importantly, most of the research on self-validation conducted so far has
examined the role of validation in thoughts that involve the self either in response to a
self-relevant persuasive proposal (e.g., a topic of high personal relevance) or in thoughts
more directly linked to the self (e.g., self-concept thoughts, Briñol & Petty, 2009). For
example, in a recent study, Briñol, Petty, and Wagner (2009) asked participants to think
about and write down their best or worse qualities while sitting with their backs erect,
pushing their chests out (i.e., confident posture potentially associated with high power)
or while sitting slouched forward with their backs curved (i.e., doubtful posture
potentially associated with low power; Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 2010; Carney, Haul, &
LeBeau, 2005; Huang, Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Guillory, 2011). Then, participants
completed a number of measures, including self-esteem. In line with the self-validation
hypothesis, it was predicted and found that the thoughts generated about the self only
affected self-attitudes in the confident posture. Thus, the effect of the direction of
thoughts on self-esteem was greater when participants wrote their thoughts when sitting
erect then when slouched. 
Although we do not expect the content of the thoughts to create a boundary condition
for self-validation to operate, one might argue that thoughts and attitudes toward other
people are different from other types of thoughts and attitudes in a number of ways.
Thus, there might be a number of reasons to expect that thoughts about other people
might not be subject to validation by power and other validating variables. First, past
research has shown that validating behaviors such as head nodding (vs. shaking; Briñol
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& Petty, 2003) only increase the use of thoughts generated by the self, but not for
thoughts generated by other people (Epley & Gilovich, 2001). This research might
suggest that it would not be the same to change the evaluation of thoughts about others
through power as changing the evaluation of self-relevant thoughts as in previous
research. 
Second, according to Fiske and her colleagues there are two aspects that are important
when evaluating other people: their perceived competence and perceived friendliness or
warmth (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2007). Some might see self-validation as relating
more to the cognitive dimension of competence than the affective dimension of warmth.
The present study included measures relevant to both constructs in order to examine to
what extent this meta-cognitive process would affect both kinds of judgments.
Finally, examining the role of self-validation through power in changing attitudes
toward people can be important for a number of practical purposes, including the
implications for training managers how to use their power more efficiently. If our
predictions are correct, instead of seeing power as a potential source of bias, powerful
individuals might deliberatively think about their power after evaluating job candidates
in order to create more merit based overall judgments.
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH
The goal of the present research was to examine the impact of power on impression
formation. In this experiment, college students examined the vita of a job candidate
composed of strong or weak arguments about his merits. This manipulation was designed
to produce mostly positive or negative thoughts about the applicant (Petty & Cacioppo,
1986). Feeling powerful should increase the effect of an argument quality manipulation on
attitudes toward the job candidate relative to feeling powerless because power would induce
a sense of confidence in one’s thoughts. Consequently, after receiving the vita, but before
reporting the evaluation of the candidate, participants were induced into either a high or
low power condition. Specifically, participants were instructed to remember episodes of
their lives in which they either had power over others or others had power over them. The
self-validation hypothesis predicts that power will interact with argument quality to
influence the evaluation of the job candidate such that evaluations will be more influenced
by vita quality when power is high rather than low. Furthermore, because of the greater
reliance on the thoughts listed under high than low power, high power individuals should
show a greater attitude-thought correspondence than low power individuals.
METHOD
Participants and Design
Participants were 115 undergraduate students at the Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid who were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (Vita quality: strong or weak
arguments) X 2 (Power: low or high) between-participants design.
Procedure
Participants were told that they would take part in two independent studies. The first
study was explained as a study on Organizational Behavior interested in gathering
students’ opinions about different potential job candidates. Participants were instructed
that today’s study involved their evaluation of a prospective job candidate. Participants’
were informed that the organizational behavior department liked to learn students’
opinions towards potential candidates, and to assess their ability to select human
resources. Specifically, participants read a cover story in which they were told that part of
the study’s purpose was to evaluate their abilities to select the vita of a job candidate. All
participants were explicitly encouraged to think carefully about the information provided
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because their abilities to select a job candidate were being evaluated and they were going
to receive feedback about their performance. Participants were assigned to read a vita
composed of either strong or weak arguments. 
After listing their thoughts about the candidate, participants were told that they were
going to participate in a second study, ostensibly a pretest measure for the development
of a life-events inventory. As part of this second study, participants were made to feel
powerful or powerless from a brief essay task (from Galinsky et al., 2003, Study 2). After
the power induction, all participants were asked to assess the candidate on a number of
evaluative items. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed.
Independent Variables
Vita Quality
All students viewed a vita for a job candidate. Half of participants viewed a vita which
contained strong information implying that the candidate would be highly qualified for
the supposed position in Marketing, whereas the remaining half reviewed a vita
containing weak information suggesting that the candidate would be poorly qualified to
fill the position. The two vitae were pre-tested, such that the strong version produced
mostly favorable thoughts about the job candidate whereas the weak version of the vita
induced mostly unfavorable thoughts. All participants were told to think about the vita
because their abilities were being evaluated and they were going to receive feedback
about their performance. 
The vita containing strong merits indicated that the candidate had earned his degrees
from a prestigious university, had professional experience in well-known corporations
(National Geographic, IBM, Repsol), spoke three relevant languages (French, English
and German), and had high knowledge about specific software programs. In essence, the
vita containing strong information clearly indicated that the candidate was well qualified
for the position. In contrast, the weak vita indicated that the candidate had yet to get
some of his degrees, had experience in unrelated jobs, spoke just one foreign language,
and did not have experience with specific software. Thus, the weak vita plainly indicated
that the candidate was not well-suited for the job. 
Power
After listing their thoughts, participants were instructed to recall two incidents in their
lives related to interpersonal power. Specifically participants assigned to the high-power
condition received instructions to recall two particular incidents in which they had power
over another individual or individuals. That is, situations in which they had controlled the
ability of another person to get something they wanted, or were in a position to evaluate
those individuals. In contrast, participants assigned to the low-power condition were asked
to recall two particular incidents in which someone else had power over them. That is,
powerless participants were asked to write about situations in which someone had control
over their ability to get something they wanted, or was in a position to evaluate them.
Participants were instructed to include the details of the situation, how they felt, and so
forth. This induction is a common and efficient procedure to induce transitory feelings of
power in the laboratory (e.g., Galinsky, et al., 2003; Rucker & Galinsky, 2008).
Dependent Measures
Cognitive responses
Following the reading of the job candidate information, and before the power
manipulation, participants were instructed to list the thoughts that went through their
minds as they were reading the vitas. They were told to write one thought per box and
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not to worry about grammar or spelling. Ten boxes were provided for their individual
thoughts or cognitive responses. After listing their thoughts for 3 minutes, participants
did the power task. Next, they were instructed to go back to their thoughts and rate them
as being positive, negative or neutral toward the candidate. An index of favorability of
candidate-related thoughts was formed by subtracting the number of unfavorable
candidate-related thoughts from the number of favorable candidate-related thoughts and
dividing by the total number of candidate-related thoughts (see Cacioppo & Petty, 1981,
for additional details on the thought listing and scoring procedure).
Attitudes toward the candidate
Following all the experimental inductions and thought ratings, participants’ attitudes
toward the candidate were assessed using nine different 9-point semantic differential
scales. The composite measure of attitude contained three ratings on general evaluative
dimensions (i.e., bad-good, negative-positive, not recommended-recommended), as well
as three more specific ratings of the candidate in terms of warmth (i.e. cold-warm,
unsociable-sociable, unpopular-popular; Fiske, et al., 2007; see also Rosenberg, Nelson,
& Vivekananthan, 1968), and three ratings of competence (i.e. undetermined-
determined, incompetent-competent, and irresponsible-responsible, e.g., Cuddy, Fiske,
& Glick, 2008). Ratings on the nine different scales were highly intercorrelated ( = .94)
and were thus averaged to create a composite attitude toward the candidate index3.
RESULTS
Dependent measures were submitted to 2 (Job candidate vita: strong or weak) X 2
(Power: high or low) analyses of variance (ANOVAS).
Cognitive responses
Analysis of the thought favorability index yielded a significant main effect of vita
quality, F(1, 111) = 273.153, p < .01. That is, participants’ cognitive responses were
more favorable toward the candidate after receiving the vita containing strong merits (M
= 0.78, SD = 0.39) than the vita containing weak merits (M= -0.64, SD = 0.47). As
anticipated, there was no main effect of power or a power x vita quality interaction on the
type of thoughts generated (p’s > .37). 
Attitudes toward the candidate
Results of the 2 X 2 ANOVA revealed a main effect of vita quality such that
participants who received the strong vita held more favorable attitudes toward the
candidate (M = 6.88, SD = 0.92) than those who received the weak version of the vita
(M = 4.82, SD = 1.00), F(1, 111) = 151.06, p < .001. Moreover, a significant Vita
Quality X Power interaction emerged, F(1, 111) = 18.44, p < .0054. As illustrated in
Figure 1, the interaction indicated that power amplified the effect of the vita quality
manipulation on attitudes so that powerful participants in the strong vita condition
formed more favorable evaluations toward the job candidate (M = 7.25, SD = 0.77) than
those in the weak vita condition (M = 4.35, SD = 0.82), t(47) = -12.62, p < .001. The
low-power condition showed a similar pattern of results (M = 6.52, SD = 0.92 and M =
5.12, SD = 0.99 for strong and weak vita respectively, t(64) = -5.53, p < .001), but the
differences between conditions were relatively smaller. 
Examined differently, this interaction revealed that among participants in the strong
vita condition, those induced to feel high-power reported more favorable attitudes (M =
7.25, SD = 0.77) than did those induced to feel low-power (M = 6.52, SD = 1.92), t(42)
= -2.85, p < .05. In contrast, among participants in the weak vita condition, those
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induced to feel high-power reported less favorable attitudes (M = 5.12, SD = 0.82) than
did those induced to feel low-power (M = 4.35, SD = 0.99), t(69) = 3.39, p = .001.
Finally, we also examined whether there was a stronger relationship between thoughts
and attitudes toward the candidate when people felt powerful versus non-powerful.
Regressing attitudes onto the relevant variables, a significant interaction emerged
between the thought-favorability index and the Power condition, B = 0.32, t(111) =
3.96, p < .001. Consistent with the self-validation logic, this interaction revealed that
participants’ thoughts exerted a stronger effect on attitudes when they felt relatively
powerful (B = 0.86, t(47) = 11.41, p < .001) than when they felt non-powerful (B = 0.62,
t(64) = 6.41, p < .001). 
DISCUSSION
In line with the self-validation hypothesis, we found that the effect of vita quality on
the evaluation of the candidate was greater when participants had high rather than low
power. With relatively high power, participants seemed to rely on the thoughts listed in
forming impressions of the job candidate, but with relatively low power, participants did
not use those thoughts to the same extent when judging the candidate (producing a lower
attitude-thought correspondence). Importantly, power did not affect the thoughts people
had about the job candidate. Rather, power affected the strength of influence thoughts
had on the evaluation of the person. That is, even though both high power and low power
groups produced the same pattern of positive and negative thoughts toward the
candidate, their final judgments were quite different.
Although the original research on power and self-validation applied confidence to
intentionally-generated mental contents relevant for persuasion, the present research has
examined whether powerful people validate whatever thoughts they have in mind,
including thoughts about other people. The results are consistent with our prediction
according to which the self-validation framework can be applied to domains other than
persuasion, such as impression formation, because meta-cognitive confidence should
apply to whatever the salient or available mental contents are at a given moment. 
Previous research conducted on self-validation has examined the effect of thought
confidence with regard to a variety of attitude objects, ranging from consumer products
(e.g., cell phones) to health policies (e.g., mandatory vaccinations), to social issues (e.g.,
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foster care programs), to the self (see Briñol & Petty, 2009, for a review). The current
research includes attitudes toward other people thereby increasing the potential
applicability of the self-validation process. 
Regardless of the particular domain of operation, we argue that for self-validation
processes to operate, the confidence that emerges from power should be salient following
(or at least, during) thought generation rather than prior to thought generation. Briñol
and colleagues (2007, Experiment 4) conducted a study in which the order in which
power and message processing took place was varied. Specifically, they manipulated the
timing of the power induction to demonstrate the consequences of two different
psychological processes: high power decreasing information-processing when preceding
the message and increasing the use of thoughts compared to low power when following
the message. These findings suggest that the same power induction can have different
(and opposite) effects depending on when the power manipulations are introduced. 
Although in the present research we have focused on the role of self-validation
processes (i.e., thought validation) as a more recently discovered mechanism by which
variables like power can impact judgments, as we noted earlier, power can also operate
through other processes in different circumstances. Specifying these different roles is
important because different mechanisms lead to different outcomes (e.g., more or less vita
quality effects depending on timing, as described above). Furthermore, different processes
can have implications for the durability and impactfulness of evaluations derived from
power. That is, when power produces effects in a thoughtful way (e.g., biasing or
validating thinking), dual process theories of attitudes argue that the resulting
judgments are more likely to persist over time, resist change, and predict behavior than
when power produces effects in a relatively non-thoughtful way (e.g., serving as input to
a heuristic; see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Moreover, because the different mechanisms
operate in different contexts, appreciation of the multiple roles for power can shed new
light on situations in which power effects should be more or less likely to emerge, and
more or less likely to be consequential. 
An important matter for future research is the exploration of whether power can be
used deliberatively in producing changes in our own psychological processes. Indeed,
managers often use their power strategically in influencing and negotiating with others.
However, it is not clear whether power-holders can also use their power deliberatively to
influence themselves. According to past research, when power precedes information
processing, people with high (vs. low) power tend to discriminate less between strong
and weak information. However, according to the present research, when power follows
information processing, it increases discrimination between strong and weak vitas. These
results suggest that power-holders can benefit from thinking about who is in charge after
(rather than before) thinking about issues and people. In other words, future work should
examine whether changes through self-validation processes can help people to rely on
their power strategically in order to generate more accurate judgments and decisions.
Notas
1 Also, this body of work has shown that what powerful people consider relevant is more likely to change as
a function of the particular situation in which they are at the time (Guinote, 2007).
2 This logic is also compatible with the fact that high-power individuals tend to show more variability of
actions, but raises the possibility that this is not because high power individuals necessarily have more
variety in their thoughts, but that they might simply be more likely to do whatever crosses their minds.
3 There was a high correlation between the three items of warmth and the three items of competence when
combined into two different composite indexes (r = .84, p < .001). Also, we run repeated-measures
ANOVA, using the type of the dependent variable (whether it is the general evaluative attitudes, ratings
of warmth or ratings of competence) as a within-subjects factor, and Power and Vita as between-subject
factor. The results of this test showed that the interaction between the type of dependent variable and the
two independent variables was not significant, F(1, 111) = 0.001, p = .979. As predicted, this suggests that
power can validate thoughts of any nature, being able to affect also different kinds of judgments.
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4 This interaction was significant also when items about general evaluations (F(1, 111) = 17.66, p < .005),
about warmth (F(1, 111) = 14.35, p < .001), and about competence (F(1, 111) = 17.66, p < .001) were
analyzed separately. 
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